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EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: 
REESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE 
ACADEMY AND PROFESSION 
Craig Allen Nard* 
Many contemporary commentators have perceived there to be a gap 
between the abstractions of the law school classroom and the exigen-
cies of realistic legal practice. The author argues that law professors 
should conduct more empirical research to narrow this gap. Adopting 
a pragmatic approach in scholarly legal writing and utilizing more 
empirical research will help legal scholars to focus better on the actual 
effect which law has on society. Based in part on the results of a tele-
phone survey of law professors, the author concludes that the reason 
for the shortage of empirical research is that legal scholars today suf-
fer from a lack of training in how to conduct empirical research. To 
remedy this problem, he proposes, among other things, that law 
schools should offer more empirical training and be more receptive to 
empirically based scholarship. 
Does it end in conclusions which, when they are referred back to ordi-
nary experiences and their predicaments, render them more significant, 
more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more fruitful? 1 
John Dewey 
Let us not become legal monks.• 
Roscoe Pound 
How am I doing?" 
Ed Koch 
* J.S.D. (candidate) and Julius Silver Fellow in Law, Science, and Technology, Colum-
bia University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Harold Edgar of Columbia 
University School of Law and the financial support of the Julius Silver program. I would 
also like to thank Professors Curtis Berger and Carol Liebman for their helpful comments 
on an earlier draft of this article, which was written for their Seminar on Legal Education at 
Columbia Law School. 
1. JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 7 (1929) [hereinafter DEWEY, EXPERIENCE 
AND NATURE]. Dewey asserts that this query is "a first-rate test of the value of any philoso-
phy which is offered to us." 
· 2. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 36 (1910) [here-
inafter Pound, Law in Books]. 
3. Former Mayor of New York City, Ed Koch, was well known for parading the streets 
of New York City while he was mayor in an attempt to gauge his performance in office. In 
effect, Mr. Koch was employing, although informally, his own version of empirical research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An ever increasing "gap" endures between the legal academy and the 
legal profession, 4 and there is a growing sense among judges and practi-
tioners that the legal academy, especially the "elite" institutions, is 
mostly to blame. The legal profession5 is experiencing feelings of aban-
donment, and, as evidence of such, points to, among other things, the 
inveterately abstract nature of legal scholarship and its inapplicability to 
the bench and bar.6 Indeed, this claim is particularly germane to most 
scholarship produced today, a vast majority of which is theoretical in na-
ture. 7 Yet, to the extent that legal scholarship is responsible for this rift, I 
4. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and 
the Legal Profession, 91 MicH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992) ("I have been deeply concerned about 
the growing disjunction between legal education and the legal profession.") [hereinafter Ed-
wards, Growing· Disjunction]; Harry T. Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping 
the Legal Profession, 38 J. LEGAL Eouc. 285, 291 (1988) (noting that "[t]here are certain 
things that only the law schools can do adequately, which are not being done because the 
law schools are not doing them"); David M. Rabban, Does Professional Education Con-
strain Academic Freedom?, 43 J. LEGAL Eouc. 358, 363 (1993) (stating that the "growing gap 
between the legal academy and the legal profession may produce unprecedented pressures 
on the traditional autonomy of law schools"); Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors 
Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDuc. 323, 325 (1989) (noting that there is a 
"widespread conviction that the gap (perhaps "chasm" would be more accurate) between 
the legal academy and the real world of practice and public policy is already alarmingly 
wide and may be approaching potentially unbridgeable dimensions"); Harry H. Wellington, 
Challenges to Legal Education: The "Two Cultures" Phenomenon, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 327, 
327 (1987) (noting that "law teachers today are more academically oriented than they were 
25 to 30 years ago ... and less professionally oriented"). See generally SECTION OF LEGAL 
EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N. LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CoNTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FoRCE ON LAW ScHOOLS 
AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) (hereinafter MAcCRATE REPORT]. 
5. The terms "legal profession" and "profession" are used interchangeably and are 
meant to include not only practitioners, but judges, administrators, and legislators, as well. 
6. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5 (1992) ("Practitioners tend to view much 
academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day concerns .... "); Ed-
wards, Growing Disjunction, supra note 4, at 42 ("The growing disjunction between legal 
education and legal practice is most salient with respect to scholarship. There has been a 
clear decline in the volume of 'practical' legal scholarship."); Louis J. Sirico & Beth A. Drew, 
The Citing of Law Reviews By the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1051, 1053 (1991) (speculating that one of the reasons federal circuit 
courts cite law reviews so infrequently is that "judges may find legal periodicals to be of 
limited value"); Louis J. Sirico & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the 
Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 131, 135 (1986) ("A growing por-
tion of academic writing, particularly in the elite journals, may be directed toward the 
scholar, rather than the bar or the bench."); Steven D. Smith, Why Should Courts Obey the 
Law?, 77 GEo. L.J. 113, 160 (1988) ("So long as judges and commentators inhabit different 
worlds and speak in different tongues, academic criticism of the courts is likely to be ineffec-
tual."). For other criticism of legal scholarship, see Edwards, Growing Disjunction, supra 
note 4, at 291; Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Writing, 39 J. LEGAL 
Enuc. 313, 320 (1989); Patricia M. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge's View 
of Practice Oriented Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL Enuc. 35, 42 (1986). 
7. Considering that theoretical scholarship has usually been signalled out for criticism 
in this regard, I would like to emphasize that it is not my intention to diminish the impor-
tance of theoretical scholarship. Certainly, scholarship relating to critical legal studies, law 
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would not place the blame solely on the propensity of legal academics to 
engage in theoretical scholarship. 
Most legal scholarship produced today is either theoretic:;al and nor-
mative in nature, or, to a lesser extent, doctrinal and descriptive.8 Both 
forms of scholarship, while very important to legal education and our le-
gal culture, have contributed to the gap between the legal academy and 
the profession by failing to focus on the societal effect of particular legal 
mechanisms. In other words, there has been a lack of empirical legal 
scholarship;9 that is, scholarship based on a detailed statistical study and 
analysis from which one could draw conclusions and formulate or 
reformulate policy.10 
Ultimately, policy choices must stand or fall on the basis of empirical 
evidence. Empirical scholarship is a window on the pathologies of the law 
and allows us to gauge the effect and efficiency, or lack thereof, of partic-
ular legal mechanisms as they presently operate within our society. 
Empirical scholarship speaks directly to those who are most profoundly 
involved in our legal institutions, by furnishing the profession with a 
compass m our sometimes foggy legal waters. Judges/1 legisla-
and literature, critical race theory, and feminist jurisprudence has contributed significantly 
to legal education. However, theoretical scholarship, with few exceptions, does not have as 
its audience judges and practitioners. At the very least, judges and practitioners are not the 
primary audience. See Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory 
(Or, Why, and to Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 389, 393 (1992) 
("In most of my work, I write as a self-conscious legal academic to and for other similarly 
self-conscious legal academics. Part of my own self-consciousness-and, I think, that of 
many of the people I am most eager to have read my articles-consists of a certain kind of 
detachment from the law and its institutions .... "); Banks McDowell, The Audiences of 
Legal Scholarship, 40 J. LEGAL Enuc. 261, 262 (1990) ("The elite scholars address each other 
in increasingly abstract and esoteric ways; they tend to be more interested in addressing the 
elite scholars of other disciplines, such as economics or philosophy, than in writing for other 
lawyers."); Ellen A. Peters, Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1193, 1193 
(1981) ("There is an increasing divergence between the theoretical interests of the aspiring 
academic lawyer and the pragmatic interests of the successful practitioner."). 
8. The distinction between normative and descriptive scholarship may not be as clear 
as one initially would assume. See Pierre J. Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 
139 u. PA. L. REV. 801, 812-14 (1991). 
9. This assertion is based on my general review of law review articles and on telephone 
conversations with 20 non-tenured and 20 tenured law professors from 20 different law 
schools (two professors from each school). The spectrum of law schools ranged from nation-
ally recognized private and state schools to regional private and state schools. For an analy-
sis of these conversations, see infra part II. See also Julius G. Getman, Contributions of 
Empirical Data to Legal Research, 35 J. LEGAL Enuc. 489 (1985); Schuck, supra note 4, at 
325-33. 
10. For a discussion of the lack of empirical legal research, see infra part II. 
11. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 16 (Cal. 1985) ("Absent legislative guid-
ance, courts cannot avoid making such policy decisions, ·and in the process of making them 
we are likely to benefit from all the assistance, in the form of analysis and empirical evi-
dence, that the parties can provide."); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of 
Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1890 (1988) ("[J]udges are increasingly concerned 
with the empirical basis and the real world effects of their decisions."); see also Peters, 
supra note 7, at 1194 (noting that "the initial fact finder ... only hears and perceives a 
small fraction of the reality of the case"). Furthermore, the use of empirical scholarship may 
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tors,12 and practitioners13 want to know, and in fact, should know, the 
societal effects of their decisions and actions. Towards this end, legal aca-
demics, by the very nature of their institutional position within our legal 
culture, 14 can contribute tremendously by producing more empirical re-
search, which, in essence, asks and answers:15 "How is the law doing?" 
Should legal academics begin to engage in a greater degree of empiri-
cal scholarship, I believe that the gap between law schools and the profes-
sion will not only cease to distend, but actually will begin to contract. If 
what I assert is true, or even partially true, the question remains: Why is 
there such a paucity of empirical legal scholarship? 
even provide a check on illegitimate governmental action. As Professor Faigman asserts, 
"[t]he Court retains legitimacy only so long as it remains within accepted bounds when 
exercising its discretion. Empirical research assists in the definition and enforcement of 
those boundaries." David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding:" Exploring 
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 602 
(1991). 
12. _ See Rubin, supra note 11, at 1887. Rubin asserts: 
To speak to a legislature or agency, legal scholars must first identify the social 
policies which their recommendations seek to implement .... Secondly, the 
recommendations must be supported by empirical data, not doctrinal argument. 
Data provides the intellectual framework of legislative or administrative action 
.... To the extent that scholars can persuade policy-oriented decision-makers, 
they will do so only by presenting empirical arguments, connected to clearly 
stated normative positions. 
Id. See also G. EDWARDS AND I. SHARKANSKY, THE PoLICY PREDICAMENT: MAKING AND IMPLE-
MENTING PuBLIC PoucY 6-10 (1978); RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CoNGRESSMEN IN CoMMITTEES 
(1973); WILLIAM MuiR, LEGISLATURE: CALIFORNIA ScHooL OF PoLITics 105-37 (1982). 
13. See Faigman, supra note 11, at 550 ("Increasingly, commentators and litigants are 
checking the modern Court's fact-finding on the basis of empirical research that only some-
times supports, and often contradicts, the Court's 'best guesses' about the world. In some 
cases, the empirical data indicates results contrary to the Justices' normative desires."). 
14. See Rubin, supra note 11, at 1890 ("[Judges] have no systematic way to gather 
data, or to measure [the] effects [of their decisions] .... Given the current structure of our 
judicial system, empirical published information of this kind will not be available unless it 
has appeared in published scholarship."). Justice Brennan also has commented that "[i]t is 
unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in 
the rigors of experimental or statistical technique." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). 
Law professors are not well trained in the empirical method. However, law professors are 
better situated to learn and teach "experimental or statistical technique" than judges, prac-
titioners, or legislators. Law professors certainly are better positioned to perform empirical 
research. 
15. This calls to mind Plato's Republic when, enraged by Socrates' elusiveness, 
Thrasymachus bellows: 
What is this nonsense that has possessed you for so long, Socrates? And why do 
you act like fools making way for one another? If you truly want to know what 
the just is, don't only ask and gratify your love of honor by refuting whatever 
someone answers--you know that it is easier to ask than to answer--but 
answer yourself and say what you assert the just to be. And see to it you don't 
tell me that it is the needful, or the helpful, or the profitable, or the gainful, or 
the advantageous; but tell me clearly and precisely what you mean, for I won't 
accept it if you say such inanities. 
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BooK ONE 13-14 (Allan Bloom, trans., Basic Books 1968). 
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Part I of this article discusses the importance and value of the empir-
ical method and empirical scholarship by briefly exploring the philosophy 
of Pragmatism and its influence on the law. Thereafter, part II explores 
why legal academics do not engage in empirical scholarship on a more 
frequent basis. Last, this article proposes a potential remedy with the 
hope of encouraging the production of more empirical scholarship. 
I. THE VALUE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
A. Pragmatism, Dewey, and the Relationship Between Mind, Matter, 
and Progress 
The philosophy of Pragmatism16 was one of the most successful at-
tempts to resolve a major intellectual crisis of the late nineteenth century. 
The crisis involved the collapse of accepted theories of truth. Most phi-
losophers, especially the Transcendentalists such as Emerson, though de-
bating various fine points, had agreed that there existed an absolute 
truth, which either corresponded to or cohered with the order of objec-
tively existing reality. However, this theory of absolute truth became un-
tenable after Charles Darwin and his theory of evolution. Reality no 
longer seemed orderly, religious texts were subjected to "higher criti-
cism," and a crisis of faith ensued. 
The Pragmatists, namely John Dewey/' attempted to solve this crisis 
of faith caused by Darwin's naturalization of humanity18 by tempering 
16. Charles Sanders Peirce is credited with developing and naming the philosophy of 
Pragmatism in the 1870s. In 1898, William James reformulated Pragmatism. According to 
Bertrand Russell, Peirce 
maintained that, in order to attain clearness in our thoughts uf an object, we 
need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may 
involve. James in elucidation, says that the function of philosophy is to find out 
what difference it makes to you or me if this or that world-formula is true. In 
this way theories become instruments, not answers to enigmas . . . . Ideas, we 
are told by James, become true in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory 
relations with other parts of our experience. 
BERTRAND RusSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 816 (1972). 
17. John Dewey, in his early years as a philosopher, was influenced by G. Stanley Hall, 
G.S. Morris, and Charles Peirce, all of whom taught at Johns Hopkins when Dewey was a 
student there. As Dewey matured as a philosopher, he was affected immeasurably by Wil-
liam James. See MORTON G. WHITE, THE ORIGIN OF DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTALISM 3-11 (1964); 
see also 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 380 (1990). 
18. Prior to Darwin, it generally was thought that as a species we possessed a spiritual 
purpose which guided our growth throughout life to the ultimate realization of our own 
perfection. Darwin severely undercut this proposition. John Dewey, in writing about Dar-
winian philosophy, stated: 
The Darwinian principle of natural selection cut straight under this philosophy 
[of purpose and design]. If all organic adaptations are due simply to constant 
variation and the elimination of those variations which are harmful in the strug-
gle for existence that is brought about by excessive reproduction, there is no call 
for a prior intelligent causal force to plan and preordain them. 
JOHN DEWEY, THE INFLUENCE OF DARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY 11-12 (1951) [hereinafter DEWEY, 
INFLUENCE OF DARWIN]. 
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Darwin's ideas with those of the German philosopher, G.W.F. HegeP9 
From Darwin, Dewey learned that humans are not distinct from nature, 
but part of the evolutionary process, and that "the brain is first and fore-
most an organ of adaptive response."20 According to Dewey, Darwinian 
logic begot an intellectual transformation: 
Interest shifts from the wholesale essence back of special changes to the 
question of how special changes serve and defeat concrete purposes; 
shifts from an intelligence that shaped things once and for all to the 
particular intelligences which things are even now shaping; shifts from 
an ultimate goal of good to the direct increments of justice and happi-
ness that intelligent administration of existent conditions may beget 
and that present carelessness or stupidity will destroy or forego. 21 
Hegel, on the other hand, provided Dewey with the notion that real-
ity is contradictory and that conflicts are fruitful collisions yielding a 
higher synthesis.22 Dewey once wrote "that there is no knowledge of any-
thing except as our interests are alive to the matter, and our will actively 
directed toward the end desired. We know only what we most want to 
know."23 With that in mind, the influence of Hegel on Dewey is apparent 
when we consider the following: "To Hegel, there is no reality until we 
know it. We exist by virtue of knowing the outside world-but the world 
also exists only by virtue of our knowing it. "24 Thus, where Descartes ut-
tered "Cogito ergo sum," Hegel went one step further and said, "My 
thinking does more. than prove my existence: it creates it."25 
In essence, Hegelian philosophy allowed Dewey to overcome the Brit-
ish empiricist notion of "dualism of subject and object" or "mind and 
19. STEVEN C. RoCKEFELLER, JOHN DEWEY: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC HUMAN-
ISM 365 (1991) ("Using neo-Hegelian theories or experience, which [Dewey] in time recon-
structed in the light of the Darwinian psychology of James and Mead, Dewey developed a 
new biological and social view of experience."). 
20. Id. at 369. 
21. DEWEY, INFLUENCE OF DARWIN, supra note 18, at 15. 
22. Hegel, like Kant who preceded him, was engaged by the question: What is the 
connection between the human mind and that which is outside of it? Hegel believed that 
there is an unity of opposites between the knower and what she knows, and that this unity 
persists throughout human progress. This method is the dialectic and can best be illustrated 
with the following example put forth by Professors Bronowski and Mazlish: 
In the dialectic we begin with a thesis-say, with a man as a person who seeks to 
know. To this thesis, nature presents an antithesis: the impersonal world resists 
the knower. There is a conflict between the thesis and the antithesis, and this is 
resolved only by a step of synthesis, which fuses the two: the knower and what is 
to be known generate a higher synthesis-generate knowledge itself. 
J. BRONOWSKI & BRUCE MAZLISH, THE WESTERN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 481-82 (1960). 
This "higher synthesis" produces another thesis and a concomitant antithesis, and this dia-
lectical process proceeds each time on a higher level. III CLASSICS OF WESTERN THOUGHT, 
THE MoDERN WoRLD 338-39 (1988). 
23. Beatrice H. Zelder, Dewey's Theory of Knowledge, in JOHN DEWEY: His THOUGHT 
AND INFLUENCE 60 (1960). 
24. BRONOWSKI & MAZLISH, supra note 22, at 483. 
25. Id. 
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matter."26 Employing this Darwinian and Hegelian view of humankind, 
- Dewey, standing on the shoulders of William James, worked out a new 
pragmatic theory of truth that described the human mind as interacting 
with the contingencies of an unstable, ever-evolving nature. 
Pragmatism espoused that truth was temporary and evolving. There 
is no fixed truth, for it possessed a temporal dimension. Pragmatism re-
jected teleological notions of society and averred that humans discover 
truth and truth comes out of the "experience-continuum."27 Truth is util-
ity; truth is what works, and to find out if it works it must be put to the 
test (i.e., experience).28 In essence, the validity of an idea is in its results, 
not its sacredness, and the way to measure results is through the use of 
empirical research.29 Professor Steven C. Rockefeller's explanation of 
John Dewey's empirical method is illustrative: 
The empirical investigator starts with a problematic situation which is 
directly encountered in ordinary experience. The investigator in seeking 
a solution to the problem may well use imagination, reason, and calcu-
lation extensively. The critical point, however, is that all such imagina-
tive and theoretical reflection must in the final analysis be referred 
back to directly experienced subject-matters for testing and verifica-
26. RocKEFELLER, supra note 19, at 365-66 (noting that Dewey "replaced the dualistic, 
mechanical, atomic, and passive emphasis in British sensationalism with a stress on experi-
ence as a fundamentally active affair involving interactions ... between an organism and 
its environment with which it is intimately related"). Others have asserted: 
[English and French] [e]mpiricist philosophers had simply thought of two 
worlds-the public world outside a man's head, and a private world inside it. For 
the empiricists, these were loosely connected by the man's senses; but the two 
were as concrete, and as separate, as a color film and a black-and-white copy. 
BRONOWSKI & MAZLISH, supra note 22, at 483. 
27. WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH 151-52 (1914). See also WILLIAM JAMES, 
PRAGMATISM (1907). 
28. The Legal Realists advocated this approach for determining the "success" of a law. 
Generally, if a law worked in practice, then it was successful. For a discussion of the influ-
ence of Pragmatism on the law, see infra part LB. 
29. In the late 17th century, the English philosopher John Locke attacked the Pla-
tonic notion of innate ideas and espoused a doctrine of empiricism: 
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all charac-
ters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that 
vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an 
almost endless variety? 
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, 
in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded, and 
from that it ultimately derives itself. 
JoHN LocKE, AN EssAY CoNCERNING HuMAN UNDERSTANDING 121-22 (1894). Early in Dewey's 
career, he defended Locke's emphasis on empiricism. See RocKEFELLER, supra note 19, at 
363. Furthermore, Jeremy Bentham's theory of legislation and morals stressed that law 
should be constructed to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. 
Because Bentham sought to codify his work, some have asked: "Are we justified in seeing 
the beginnings of logical positivism [in Bentham]? Can we number among his disciples ... 
the logical positivists-those who assert that statements, such as 'this is a beautiful thing,' 
which are not 'empirically verifiable,' are merely nonsense, i.e., of no sense?" BRONOWSKI & 
MAZLISH, supra note 22, at 498. 
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tion. Verification involves determining if a solution to the original prob-
lem has been in fact achieved. An empirical inquiry, then, starts and 
terminates in concrete experience. As a consequence an empirical inves-
tigation and the knowledge it generates increase understanding of the 
things of concrete experience and function as a means of control mak-
ing possible an increase in the beneficial use and enjoyment of these 
things.•• 
Dewey envisioned a community of inquirers. In fact, for Dewey, in-
quiry both requires such a community and helps to further the develop-
ment of this community.81 Viewed in this light, empirical research is a 
reflective evaluation, which acts as a loran, a guide for social reform,32 
individual growth,88 and progress towards the "good life,"84 in that it pro-
vides a veritable understanding of that which affects our lives,35 including 
30. ROCKEFELLER, supra note 19, at 364. 
31. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 17, at 383. This is remindful of the 
work of Francis Bacon and his "Experimental Philosophy," whereby he envisioned a com-
munity of scientists actively engaged in experimentation while paying little attention to the-
ory. Bacon, who viewed science as a means of serving society, greatly influenced the Royal 
Society of 17th century England and its "Fellows" like Christian Huygens, Robert Boyle, 
and Robert Hooke. BRONOWSKI & MAZLISH, supra note 22, at 186-87. 
32. See BRONOWSKI & MAZLISH, supra note 22, at 250 (noting that philosophers of 
18th century France used empiricism as a means of social and political reform). 
33. According to Professor Daniel J. Boorstin, "Dewey's grand encompassing aim was 
'growth'-growth for every citizen, and growth for society." DANIEL J. BooRSTIN, THE AMERI-
CANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 498 (1974). 
34. RoNALD DwoRKIN, JusTICE AND THE GooD LIFE 9 (1990). Dworkin addresses the 
connection between living a g~od life (i.e. well-being) and justice, and asserts that justice is 
not only a component of well-being, but a condition, as well. Dworkin calls this assertion the 
"parameter thesis": "It assumes that someone's well-being must be judged in terms of how 
adequately that person has responded to the challenges and constraints of his culture and 
circumstance, and insists that these constraints include parameters of fairness and justice 
.... " Id. 
Dworkin proceeds to define the "good life" in terms of what he calls the "response 
account": 
[A] life is a good one in virtue of being an appropriate response to the opportu-
nities and challenges provided by the circumstances in which it is lived . . . . 
Like athletics and art, living well cannot be defined in the abstract. There is no 
such thing as just living well: people live well by making the appropriate re-
sponse to their physical powers and circumstances, to their expected life span, to 
their culture and the expectations of their society, and to the economy of supply 
and demand in which they find themselves. 
Id. at 11-12. 
Dworkin's "response theory" operates within the norms of everyday life. A "good life" is 
judged by the response one makes to the realities of one's daily life. Thus, it is important to 
understand what these realities are so that a person desiring to lead a "good life" could 
respond accordingly. What that response should be, however, is a separate matter, beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
35. Ludwig Wittgenstein, for whom "propositions were representations of reality," 
thought that silence is inevitable where knowledge is lacking: 
[H]e who understands [my propositions] finally recognizes them as senseless, 
when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to 
speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) 
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. 
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the decisions and promulgations of our legal institutions.86 Once armed 
with such an understanding, we as members of a liberal state acting thor-
ough our duly elected representatives have a responsibility, a devoir, to 
take action to better our lives and to facilitate the fulfillment of our re-
spective "potentialities." We are not passive spectators, but players, con-
stantly interacting with our evolving environment.37 In fact, Dewey 
interpreted Darwinian philosophy as introducing "responsibility into the 
intellectual life:" 
To idealize and rationalize the universe at large is after all a confession 
of inability to master the courses of things that specifically concern us. 
As long as mankind suffered from this impotency, it naturally shifted a 
burden of responsibility that it could not carry over to the more compe-
tent shoulders of the transcendent cause. But if insight into specific 
conditions of value and into specific consequences of ideas is possible, 
philosophy must in time become a method of locating and interpreting 
the more serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of 
projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and political 
diagnosis and prognosis."" 
This is what Dewey meant by "method of intelligence;" that is, "a 
conversion of past experience into knowledge and projection of that 
knowledge in ideas and purposes that anticipate what may come to be in 
Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 189 (1922). This last sentence is 
noteworthy. Empirical research can be viewed as a means of preventing silence, a ladder 
which leads to greater understanding. 
36. Frank Munger, Sociology of Law For a Postliberal Society, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 
89, 92 (1993). In discussing the tension between legal scholarship and social science scholar-
ship, Professor Munger states that "empirical research has always offered the promise of 
improved understanding of the reasons or the consequences of the legal system's decisions 
and actions, and thus, has always been quite compatible with enlightened law scholarship." 
Id. See also MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF 
DIVORCE REFORM 143 (1991) (stating that "empirical scholarship is more than simply 
counting"). 
37. Experience for Dewey was a process of perpetual interaction and adaptation. 
Dewey writes: "When objects are isolated from the experience through which they are 
reached and in which they function, experience itself becomes reduced to the mere process 
of experiencing, and experiencing is therefore treated as if it were also complete in itself." 
DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 1, at 11. Professor Robert Pollack also has 
written: 
In the open, incomplete, temporal world of the pragmatists there is a marked 
gain in visibility with respect to the true setting of human experience. Given a 
world that is still in the making, and in which nature is gropingly and experi-
mentally pushing forward, it would seem that, of necessity, a being capable of 
thought must play a more active part in the cosmic story. "We are not utter 
foreigners in the world," says Peirce. And indeed, so truly do we belong within 
nature, that as rational beings our role can be nothing less than efficient and 
codetermining, if only through our capacity to remake our own lives and to 
adapt to our environment to the immensities of the human spirit. 
Robert C. Pollock, Process and Experience, in JoHN DEWEY: His THOUGHT AND INFLUENCE 
180 (1960). 
38. DEWEY, INFLUENCE OF DARWIN, supra note 18, at 17 (emphasis added). 
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the future and that indicate· how to realize what is desired. "39 Dewey's 
"method of intelligence" is an empowering message, for we have the abil-
ity to diagnose our lives and take steps to improve them. Thus, for 
Dewey, the empirical method infuses into this notion of "experience" an 
educative element, which leads to a better understanding of the human 
condition.40 
B. The Influence of Pragmatism on the Law 
In the early twentieth century, philosophical Pragmatism greatly in-
fluenced the introduction of the social sciences to the study of law.41 In 
39. JoHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SociAL AcTION 50 (1935). Dewey also asserted that 
"[s]ince the ends of liberalism are liberty and the opportunity of individuals to secure full 
realization of their potentialities, all of the emotional intensity tha( belongs to these ends 
gathers about the ideas and acts that are necessary to make them real." ld. at 51. 
40. In his Experience and Nature, Dewey distinguishes between primary and second-
ary experience. Primary experience is not cognitive, does not take the self into account, and 
cannot distinguish between subject and object. Yet this primary experience can be trans-
formed into secondary experience by what Professor Rockefeller says is a "process of intel-
lectual reflection into conceptual objects including the distinction between subject and 
object." RocKEFELLER, supra note 19, at 366. Professor Rockefeller illustrates Dewey's no-
tion of experience as a social process with clear Hegelian and Darwinian overtones: 
For Dewey, experience entails a process of interaction in which there is a percep-
tion of the connections between what we do and what we suffer and enjoy as a 
consequence .... 
Experience alternates between settled situations, in which there is harmony 
with the environment and a sense of well-being, and problematic situations 
which generate dissatisfaction, anxiety, and desire. Reflection and the quest for 
knowledge arise when the self in the course of the action-undergoing that consti-
tutes primary experience encounters disharmony with its environment or suffers 
certain problems. The basic function of thinking is increased power of prediction 
and control, making it possible to expand and better the subject matters of 
experience. 
ld. at 369. 
41. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943, 956 (1987). See also Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth 
Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General 
Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861, 871 (1981) (discussing the influ-
ences of Pragmatism on legal philosophy). Dewey's influence on the law in the first half of 
the 20th century has been expressed as follows: 
As one looks back from the mid-point of the twentieth century at the striking 
social, economic, political, and legal changes that have occurred during that cen-
tury, what basic philosophic pattern or patterns can one find in the turmoil of 
ideas and events? One was an attack upon the self-sufficiency of the legal order, 
upon its capacity to yield solutions for every legal problem from its store of 
traditional axioms and postulates, and, on the positive side, an insistence that 
the solutions of legal problems depended, in part at least, upon the appraisal of 
social factors. Another was the belief that social change, the amelioration of liv-
ing conditions, need not be left to the control of inscrutable "natural" laws of 
economics, biology and sociology, but could be promoted by well-planned gov-
ernmental action through law. A third, more esoteric in character, had to do with 
the judicial process. However courts may decide the controversies brought before 
them by legal procedure, they are, in many cases at least, not compelled by the 
inexorable compulsion of established premises to decide the case just one way. 
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fact, it has been said that "Pragmatism seems especially congenial to the 
legal mind."42 The Pragmatists challenged the Langdellian notions of the 
law as an exact science based on objective rules,43 and furnished legal 
scholars with a result-oriented logic.44 The Pragmatists focused on the 
effect that the law was having on society and on the importance of empir-
ical research in measuring this effect.45 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the progenitor of Legal Realism, and 
Roscoe Pound applied these Pragmatic notions to the law!6 Holmes em-
phasized that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence,"47 and lawyers should "think things not words."48 Roscoe Pound 
admonished his contemporaries to study "the law in action,"49 and de-
fined mechanical jurisprudence, as Dewey would have, as "the rigorous 
logical deduction from predetermined conceptions in disregard of and 
Rather the decision involves deliberation and discretion, in which the attitudes 
and beliefs of the judge or judges have some sway. All three of these generaliza-
tions have, on the positive side, been stated above more moderately and cau-
tiously than their most ardent proponents have stated them. As so stated they 
are compatible with, and have been immeasurably influenced by, John Dewey's 
philosophy. 
Edwin W. Patterson, Dewey's Theories of Legal Reasoning and Valuation, in JOHN DEWEY: 
PHILOSOPHER OF SCIENCE AND FREEDOM 118, 118 (Sidney Hook ed., 1950). 
42. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331, 
1342 (1988). 
43. Summers, supra note 41, at 866. 
44. See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CoRNELL L.Q. 17 (1924) (defending 
decisions based on unreasoned common sense as producing fair results). 
45. Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 956-57 ("This message of truth-in-consequences sup-
ported a view of law as dynamic, functional, relativistic, and experimental. Law was not a 
'brooding omnipresence,' but rather a particular means to socially defined ends, and the test 
of the law was empirical."). It also is important to note that in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, European sociologists Max Weber and Emile Durkheim espoused a scientific ap-
proach to society and advocated the use of empirical research as a means of gathering 
knowledge about the society in which they lived. Furthermore, H.L.A. Hart has emphasized 
the importance of studying law in a societal context or what he calls "descriptive sociology": 
[F]or the suggestion that inquiries into the meanings of words merely throw 
light on words is false. Many important distinctions, which are not immediately 
obvious, between types of social situation or relationships may best be brought 
to light by an examination of the standard uses of the relevant expressions and 
of the way in which these depend on a social context, itself often unstated. 
H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAw vii (1961). 
46. Patterson, supra note 41, at 121 ("Dewey's influence would be misleading without 
the reservation that two of the most influential American legal philosophers of the present 
century, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Roscoe Pound, derived their inspiration and initial 
guidance chiefly from William James, of whom Dewey was a follower."). 
47. OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES, JR., THE CoMMON LAW 1 (Dover 1991) (1881). 
48. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REv. 
443, 460 (1899). 
49. Pound, Law in Books, supra note 2, at 12; Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 
YALE L.J. 454 (1909) [hereinafter Pound, Liberty of Contract]; Roscoe Pound, Mechanical 
Jurisprudence, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908). In fact, it was Pound who made the link be-
tween Pragmatism and legal scholarship. Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 957; Summers, supra 
note 41 at 868-69. 
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often in the teeth of the actual facts."50 Legal academics at Yale and Co-
lumbia, where Dewey's tenure extended from 1904 to 1939, such as Un-
derhill Moore, William 0. Douglas, Herman Oliphant, and Hessel 
Yntema, were also influenced by the Pragmatists.61 These legal academics 
and others of like mind stressed the applicability and relevance of the 
social sciences and empirical research to legal studies. 62 As a result, the 
social sciences assumed an increasingly important role in legal education, 
especially at Columbia, which eventually gave birth to "legal functional-
ism."63 Legal functionalism has been defined as "sociologically-based and 
result-oriented"54 or that which is "related to the areas of social life af-
fected by law."55 In essence, legal functionalism focused on the way in 
which law functioned in society. 
The Legal Realists, which, to a certain extent, were the heirs appar-
ent of the "Functionalists," drove yet another, if not the final, nail in the 
coffin of Langdellian legal science.56 Although difficult to isolate a com-
mon, unifying principle of the Realists, they did share a skepticism about 
the notion of an objective, value-free legal system: 
The major contribution of the Realist movement was to kill the 
Langdellian notion of law as an exact science, based on the objectivity 
of black-letter rules. When it became acceptable to write about the law 
as it actually operated, legal rules could no longer be assumed to be 
value-free. This change inevitably caused the predictive value of doc-
trine to be seriously questioned. The vantage point of American legal 
scholarship was finally established as being process rather than 
50. Pound, Liberty of Contract, supra note 49, at 462. 
51. John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The 
Singular Case for Underhill Moore, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 195 (1980) (discussing the shift away 
from American Legal Realism at Yale University); John H. Schlegel, American Legal Real-
ism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 459 (1980) 
(same). See generally ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM 
THE 1850s TO THE 1980s 131-54 (1983) (discussing pragmatic influences on Columbia Univer-
sity law professors); Patterson, supra note 41, at 128 (noting Dewey's pragmatism in the 
work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Welsey H. Holifield, and Arthur L. Corbin). 
52. John H. Schlegel & David M. Trubek, Charles E. Clark and the Reform of Legal 
Education, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 81 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991). Dean Clark 
sought to reorient legal scholarship by developing a program at Yale, which "[a]t its core 
[has] the idea that legal scholarship should move away from the study of appellate cases to 
empirical inquiry into law and social problems." ld. 
53. STEVENS, supra note 51, at 139-40. Eventually, the Columbia movement toward 
integrating the social sciences to legal studies failed. Herman Oliphant and Hessel Yntema 
thereafter helped found the Johns Hopkins Institute for the Study of Law, which had as its 
focus empirically based research. However, due partly to the depression, the Johns Hopkins 
experiment did not succeed. Underhill Moore and William 0. Douglas left for Yale, but 
their efforts to engage in sustained empirical research also fell short. I d. 
54. Peter N. Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal 
For the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1042 (1991). 
55. STEVENS, supra note 51, at 137, 147 n.56. 
56. ld. at 156. See also KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 269 (1989) ("Legal real-
ism stressed the functions of law rather than the abstract conceptualization of it, to which 
Langdell had been wedded."). 
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substance. 57 
The Legal Realists, like the Functionalists, focused on how the law 
operated within society, the current effect the law had on society, and 
"constantly asked: what use is this rule?"58 In rejecting the operational 
objectivity of the law and purity of concept, the Realists put their faith in 
facts and were "united in calling for empirical studies of law as the pre-
requisite to reform."59 Indeed, "the empirical study of legal institutions 
. . . has it roots in legal realism. "60 
However, as the Second World War came to a close, so to did the 
Realist movement; but the Realists' belief that the law should be studied 
as it actually operates has currency in the form of the Law and Society 
movement, the successor to the Realists.61 Professor Lawrence Friedman 
has defined the Law and Society movement as a "scholarly enterprise 
that explains or describes legal phenomena in social terms. "62 Although 
Law and Society scholars are part of the current legal academic land-
scape, their presence is relatively small and generally not warmly 
received. 
While the previously described "reality-based"63 movements differ 
from one another to a certain extent, they have in common and have laid 
stress to the belief that the law has sociological ramifications, and the way 
to measure these ramifications is through the employment of empirical 
57. STEVENS, supra note 51, at 156. Stevens also said about the Realists that "[i]t was 
one thing to agree that legal objectivity and neutrality were myths; it was another to destroy 
such myths, providing as they do vital elements of social control, without offering any alter-
natives. Such an undermining of legal sinews proved to be the Realists' lasting monument." 
!d. (citations omitted). Not surprisingly, the Critical Legal Studies movement has come 
under similar attack. See Edwards, Growing Disjunction, supra note 4, at 47. 
Yet not all movements that have cast doubt on Langdellian objectivity have left a void 
in their wake. According to Professor Aleinikoff, "[P]ragmatism reassured legal schoiars that 
abandonment of the goal of formal certainty did not necessarily entail nihilism; on the con-
trary, it liberated scholars to develop and test new rules for new social conditions." 
Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 957. , 
58. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 591-92 (1973). See also 
Summers, supra note 41, at 937-46. 
59. Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the 
Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 443 (1987). 
60. Paul Brest, Plus Ca Change, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1945, 1946 (1993). 
61. Id. 
62. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763, 
763 (1986) [hereinafter Friedman, The Law and Society Movement]. Professor Friedman 
has also commented that Law and Society "scholars try to be systematic about their subject; 
they try to achieve rigor in method or theory, and they attempt to separate normative from 
descriptive issues. Typically, their object of study is living law .... " Id. 
63. The term "reality-based" incorporates the Legal Functionalists, Legal Realists, 
and the Law and Society movement. I chose this term for two reasons. First, it is linguisti-
cally convenient. Simply using one term to describe three movements is more convenient 
that restating the names of all three. Second, I think it adequately describes the three 
movements in that all profess to be grounded in reality in -the sense that they focus on the 
sociological ramifications of the law and utilize the empirical method. At the very least, 
these reality-based movements place a great deal of emphasis on how the law operates 
within society. Possibly a better term would have been "empirically based" movements. 
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research. These movements also a,ssert that the law should be result-ori-
ented, measuring the results with empirical research. Yet empirical re-
search should not only be embraced by a few select legal movements, for 
it is a natural concomitant to the law as a whole. The law affects the lives 
of those to whom it applies. These effects, like Dworkin's "good life," can-
not be measured in the abstract, but must be viewed in the context of 
reality where inefficiencies and unexpected results could be ascertained 
and calls for reform sustained. As Judge Peters states: "From where I sit, 
legal scholarship is, and must be a continuing dialogue with reality. The 
mission that ultimately unites us all is the fundamental struggle of the 
law to cope with unruly reality. "64 
The social utility of empirical research has changed very little from 
the time of John Dewey and the Pragmatists to the present. In the con-
text of our legal system, to convert our experiences into knowledge, law 
professors, as a community of inquirers, should distance themselves from 
a priori normativity and become more receptive to the empirical method, 
where the focus is on the efficacy of law and how it influences our lives.65 
By examining the law in its social setting, the legal profession is better 
able to understand its social function, remedy existing misperceptions, 
and determine what changes in the law, if any, can be made to "realize 
what is desired," namely, a societal atmosphere conducive to human 
growth and justice. In short, a "good life." Thus, I do not believe I am 
straining one's sense of credulity by asserting that empirical research is, 
potentially, an empowering instrument which can be used to better our 
lives. 
I realize that I am portraying the role of empirical research very fa-
vorably, without discussing some of its negative aspects. For example, 
once the results of an empirical survey have been obtained the question 
remains: What are we to do now? 66 That is, a guiding principle is needed 
to achieve or remedy what the empirical data uncovers. It is at this point 
64. Peters, supra note 7, at 1193. 
65. I agree with Professor Summers that an efficacy determination must go beyond 
mere observation. There is an evaluative contextual component to this determination, for 
"[t]he ultimate question is whether the use of the law being judged is sufficiently effective, 
and an answer to this calls for the exercise of evaluative judgment." Summers, supra note 
41, at 938. Once the facts are gathered, they cannot be viewed without considering a number 
of contextual factors associated with law and what it was trying to achieve. With that in 
mind, "the issue becomes one of sufficiency of effects in relation to such factors as the diffi-
culties of realizing the goals, the amenability of the goals to direct means, the extent to 
which resources are allocated to the problem, the conflicting goals that are affected, and the 
time interval required for the use of law to take hold." ld. at 939. 
66. This, of course, assumes that those conducting the empirical research arrived at 
the same conclusion. However, individual researchers may have their own political and so-
cial agenda, and may structure their research to accommodate this agenda. The researchers' 
empirical data must sustain mutual scrutiny. What we are left with, at times, is a sense of 
confusion and frustration. Such a scenario is common among politicians who, depending on 
your political bent, cite figures on the federal deficit or tax policy wholly inconsistent with 
each other. This leads to the question: How can a solution or policy be agreed upon if the 
problem itself is subject to· disagreement? 
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that socio-economic and political biases of judges and legislators are man-
ifested. For instance, given the fact that there is a federal deficit, many 
would agree that it is important to balance the budget. Yet, indisputable 
empirical data may beget numerous potential solutions. With this weak-
ness in mind, however, empirical data still has a positive effect in that it 
serves a democratic purpose. Confronted with a societal problem, our offi-
cials, assuming they desire to address the issue, are forced to divulge their 
political and legal philosophy. This gives the electorate something to de-
bate.67 In turn, the public benefits from a sense of stability in that politi-
cal and legal decisions comprise a collective component. That is, decisions 
are not based on a judge's or legislator's personal bias, but on collective 
agreement within the community. Empirical data helps us ascertain 
whether our policies will survive their first articulation. 
II. WHY IsN'T THERE MoRE EMPIRICAL LEGAL ScHOLARSHIP? 
Initially, let me say that while most legal scholarship produced today 
is theoretically based, I believe that there has been an increase in the 
amount of empirical research by legal scholars. 68 Yet, despite the recog-
nized benefits of empirical research, this increase is relatively small. Al-
though I think that most legal academics would like to see more empirical 
research,69 few engage in such a task. Why is this the case? The results of 
a telephone survey I conducted suggest at least three reasons. 
In this survey, I asked forty law professors70 from twenty different 
law schools71 the following question: Do you think there is a lack or 
67. This debate informs our vote whether it be for a federal, state, or local official. 
Another example is Senate confirmation hearings for appointments to the United States 
Supreme Court. Recall the vigorous debate surrounding the confirmation hearings of then 
Judge Robert Bork. In spite of much of the hyperbole, reasonable minds certainly could 
differ on Mr. Bork's judicial philosophy as set forth in his writings and opinions. 
68. For a list of significant empirical studies, see Schuck, supra note 4, at 329-30 n.28. 
For three excellent recent empirical studies in the area of administrative law, see Thomas 
W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 
(1994); Peter H. Schuck & Donald E. Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study 
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984 (1990). 
69. See Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, & the Middle Ground, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 2075, 2087 (1993). 
[I]f I had the power-which of course I do not except insofar as I can influence 
students who then go into law teaching-to redirect legal scholarship, I would 
use it to try to promote more empirical work, institutional description, and law-
in-action studies. Sometimes I think I would happily trade a whole year's worth 
of the doctrinal output turned out regularly by smart law review editors and law 
teachers for a single solid piece describing how some court, agency, enforcement 
process, or legal transaction actually works. 
I d. See also Teresa Sullivan et al., The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy 
Policy, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1987, at 19_5, 196 (1987) ("Our thesis is that empiri-
cal research is vitally needed in the formation of bankruptcy policy and that it is possible to 
develop empirical data that will become an indispensable part of that process."). 
70. For this survey, I randomly selected 20 tenured and 20 non-tenured law professors. 
71. The selected law schools were diverse with respect to both reputation (i.e., na-
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shortage of empirical research in legal scholarship? The results of my sur-
vey are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Do you think there is a lack or shortage of empirical research in legal scholarship? 
Law Yes No 
Professors 
Tenured 80% 10% 
Non-tenured 95% 0% 
Overall 87.5% 5% 
As indicated, a vast majority of those surveyed believed that there 
was a lack of empirical research in legal scholarship. Implicit in this find-
ing is that law professors recognize the benefits of empirical research. The 
question remains as to why more research of this kind is not produced. 
I asked the professors who answered affirmatively to question one the 
following: Why do you think there is a lack or shortage of empirical re-
search in legal scholarship? The results are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Why do you think there is a lack or shortage of empirical research in legal scholarship? 
Law Lack of Not Viewed Favorably Too Labor Intensive/ 
Professors Training for Tenure Time Consuming 
Tenured 70% 35% 25% 
Non-tenured 95% 25% 15% 
Overall 82.5% 30% 20% 
The overwhelming response, especially from non-tenured professors, 
was a lack of training in the empirical method. 72 This response should 
come as no surprise. The curriculum at most, if not all, law schools is not 
designed to train students in the empirical method. Thus, law students, 
some of whom are destined to become law professors, graduate without 
any understanding of the empirical method or statistical analysis and 
they are not likely to gain any such understanding in practice or on the 
bench. This lack of training deters law professors, whether tenured or 
not, from performing empirical research. Why would law professors em-
bark on an unknown course without the requisite training and tools? It is 
less demanding and potentially more rewarding to stay in one's office, 
tiona!, regional, or state school) and geography. 
72. A few professors indicated their belief that lack of funding was another reason for 
the lack of empirical research. I chose not to include this answer in the table, however, 
because while this is indeed a serious problem, I believe it is closely tied to lack of training. 
But see James E. Herget, Shaking Loose From An Old Jurisprudence: What is the Price?, 
36 Sw. L.J. 807, 810 (1982) ("Down to the present time [empirical] scholarship ... has been 
but a small part of the vast bulk of scholarly discourse in the law reviews, legal treatises, 
and texts, despite funding and encouragement from the American Bar Foundation and 
other national funding agencies."). 
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before one's computer, and theorize; an endeavor for which law professors 
are well equipped. 
Furthermore, upon entering the legal academy, assistant and non-
tenured associate professors have tenure as one of their goals. In my sur-
vey, twenty-five percent of non-tenured professors were concerned that 
empirical research would not be viewed favorably by their respective ten-
ure committees. An even greater percentage of tenured professors, thirty-
five percent, voiced the same concern. I believe, however, that this con-
cern improperly views empirical scholarship in a vacuum. At present, to 
the extent that empirical scholarship is· disfavored with respect to tenure, 
such a position is inextricably linked to the fact that law professors lack 
the training to engage in empirical research.73 Given this fact, why would 
a non-tenured professor endeavor to produce an empirical piece of schol-
arship without the requisite training and then proceed to rely on that 
scholarship as a tenure piece? Even if the empirical scholarship is well 
done, there may persist, at least initially, a negative perception by a ten-
ure committee simply because of the nature of the scholarship; and the 
committee's own lack of training in empirical research may hinder the 
evaluative process. In addition, collaborative scholarship with, for in-
stance, a sociologist, is frowned upon for tenure purposes even though 
collaborative efforts are common in other disciplines such as medical re-
search or economics. 74 
Although the desire to obtain tenure is a factor, it should not be 
overemphasized because, if for no other reason, it fails to explain why 
tenured professors do not engage in empirical research. Their decision not 
to engage in such research must be motivated by another factor. While 
there are a number of reasons as to why law professors do not. engage in 
more empirical research, I believe that for most professors, whether ten-
ured or non-tenured, the lack of training alone is an adequate deterrent.7~ 
Although the amount of work and time associated with empirical re-
73. I also believe the "too labor intensive/time consuming" factor is tied in to lack of 
training. 
74. I never quite understood why collaborative research efforts are discouraged. To the 
extent that a tenure committee is unable to asceitain a candidate's contribution to a schol-
arly work, I would think that such a concern is subordinate to more important determina-
tions: Does the work have merit and is it something with which the law school would want 
to be associated? The single authorship requirement may more easily be justified with re-
spect to theoretical or doctrinal scholarship. With empirical scholarship, however, such a 
requirement is counter-productive. It not only discourages the production of potentially 
good scholarship, but also acts as a disincentive for law professors to entertain new disci-
plines, new ways of thinking, and professional camaraderie. For a further discussion of this-
situation, see infra note 83. 
75. In addition to lack of training, tenure, time constraints, and resources, Professor 
Schuck cites other reasons for the present lack of empirical scholarship in the legal commu-
nity: (1) inconvenience; (2) lack of control; (3) tedium; (4) uncertainty; and {5) ideology. 
Schuck, supra note 4, at 331-33. I agree that all of these reasons contribute to the paucity of 
empirical research. Yet these reasons, with the possible exception of ideology and uncer-
tainty, may so be related to the fact the law professors are not trained in the empirical 
method as to become simply part of the "lack of training" explanation. 
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search is significant, I would assert that, to a lesser extent, such burden 
inheres to the production of most valuable scholarship. More important, 
however, unfamiliarity with the empirical method may lead to an exag-
gerated perception of its difficulty. This misconception may, in turn, 
overshadow the value of empirical research.78 If legal academics were bet-
ter trained in the empirical method, perhaps their perception would 
soften. This is not to suggest that training will make the work associated 
with empirical research become any less rigorous or time consuming. 
Rather, through training, the prospect of an empirical enterprise may be-
come less intimidating.77 Moreover, I know of few law professors who 
chose their profession for its simplicity. 
The problem faced by those of us who would like to see more empiri-
cal research can best be illustrated by looking to law schools' lack of re-
ceptiveness to the Law and Society movement. This movement, with its 
emphasis on empirical research, has made some inroads into the legal 
academy, yet remains "a stepchild in the law school world."78 Professor 
Friedman has discussed the disfavor in which most legal academics view 
the Law and Society movement and has suggested possible reasons for it: 
To begin with, empirical research is hard work, and lots of it; it is also 
nonlibrary research, and many law teachers are afraid of it; it calls for 
skills that most law teachers do not have; if it is at all elaborate, it is 
team research, and law teachers are not used to this kind of effort; 
often it requires hustling grant money from foundations or government 
76. This sense of difficulty also may include some of Professor Schuck's reasons, such 
as inconvenience, lack of control, and tedium. Schuck, supra note 4, at 331. With respect to 
the "uncertainty" reason, Professor Schuck states: 
I d. 
Until one gathers and analyzes the data, one cannot know whether one will make 
important new findings or "merely" confirm what everybody (especially in retro-
spect) "already knows." In contrast, the articles that we typically write exhibit a 
kind of predestination; once we have thought our ideas through, we know where 
we are headed. Few surprises await us, and perhaps we prefer it that way. 
Perhaps law professors do "prefer it that way." Yet is it not uncertainty that begets an 
empirical study? That is, empirical research is valuable because it can turn uncertainty into 
certainty, or at least, a greater degree of certainty. Although initially it may be disap-
pointing to discover that the data does not support one's policy position, at least one is 
better informed and can begin to rethink one's position. If it turns out that one only "con-
firmed what everybody ... 'already knows[,]' " that does not necessarily mean that the 
research was a waste of time. Researchers have different political and social agenda and may 
employ an empirical research strategy to accommodate those agenda. Society thus may be 
better served if various empirical research methods result in the same findings, for duplicate 
findings serve to ensure a greater degree of certainty. 
77. Edward L. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 792, 827 (1991). 
I d. 
While all of this social science can appear to be a daunting prospect to academ-
ics whose training consisted of reading appellate decisions, law professors, in 
theory, are able to perform social science studies. Some have, and most probably 
could with a combination of self-training, collaborative efforts, and the collegial 
assistance generally available on a university campus. 
78. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, supra note 62, at 774. 
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agencies, and law teachers simply do not know how to do that. 
Prestige is a factor too. Law schools . . . tend to exalt "theory" over 
applied research. Empirical research has an applied air to it, compared 
to "legal theory." The law and society movement stresses the impor-
tance of what is happening in society, as opposed to exclusive attention 
to what is 'inside' the system. This means, first of all, that one has to 
know something about the surrounding society-things lawyers are un-
likely to know, in any systematic way.79 
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Some law professors, however, recognize the advantages of empirical 
research and would like to see more. So what is to be done? In the next 
section, I avail myself to make some suggestions that, although not pan-
acean, I hope will encourage current and future legal academics to pro-
duce more empirically based legal scholarship, or, at least, begin to 
consider such an endeavor. 
III. WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
As stated above, there are several reasons why law professors do not 
engage in more empirical research. However, I believe that most of these 
reasons are inextricability linked to the fact that lawyers generally, and 
law professors specifically, are not well trained in the empirical method. If 
law professors were better trained in the empirical method, the discourag-
ing effects of many of the other reasons might be mollified. For instance, 
non-tenured law professors might feel more confident in their abilities to 
produce a scholarly empirical piece. Tenured faculty members might have 
an enhanced sense of appreciation for the amount of work and difficulty 
associated with empirical research. This enhanced sense of appreciation 
might also encourage tenured faculty to pursue their own empirical stud-
ies and to recognize the efforts of others when it comes time to make 
tenure decisions. Further, funding for empirical research might increase 
as law professors become better trained and the beneficial effects of em-
pirical research become more pronounced. Obviously, legal academics 
need to address this lack of training in the empirical method. I propose 
the following: 
(1) Require students to take a course in empirical or statistical 
methodology during their first year. To require such a class is a bold 
suggestion, and anything resembling it is unlikely to be implemented in 
the near future. Most law schools require their students to take, in the 
first year of study, a "legal methods" or "legal process" class, wherein the 
student is introduced to legal institutions and processes. I do not question 
the importance of these classes, but it is not fantastic to suggest that stu-
dents be required to take "legal methods," for example, in the second or 
third year of law school and introduce empirical methodology in the first 
year curriculum. 80 Any difficulty could be addressed by grading the class 
79. Id. 
80. I d. Columbia University School of Law offers a class entitled "Statistics for Law-
yers." This non-required class is taught by a Lecturer in Law, not a full-time member of the 
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on a pass/fail basis. With such a grading system, students, who are likely 
to experience some uneasiness, will feel less intimidated in the face of 
empiricism. 
(2) Offer advanced upper-level classes in empirical or statistical 
methodology. For students who want to build on the first-year class, an 
upper-level elective should be available. This course especially should 
seek to attract students who desire to enter the teaching profession. Most 
graduate programs in education require statistical methods courses so 
that future college professors will be able to approach research analysis 
properly. Future law professors should endeavor to have equivalent skills 
and familiarity with empirical analysis. 
(3) Encourage the faculty to emphasize to their students that the 
law has sociological ramifications. An example of this is for law profes-
sors to use empirical data as a pedagogical tool. Empirical data could be 
used to demonstrate the effects of products liability suits on manufac-
turer safety efforts or could illustrate the impact of legislation on social 
concerns such as drunk driving. Another example would be to take a 
"field trip" to a trial or hearing that pertains to an area of the law that is 
currently being·covered in class.81 Such a "field trip" would provide a real 
life glimpse of the impact of the law on individuals and society as a 
whole. Additionally, attendance at a hearing or trial may provide a start-
ing point for interest in collecting data to demonstrate the perceived ef-
fects of the law. 
faculty. A description of the class is as follows: 
In recent years, proof based on statistical evidence has come to play a key role in 
diverse types of litigation. Some prominent examples are epidemiological studies 
in mass tort cases, multiple regression models in employment discrimination 
class actions, and Bayesian probabilities in paternity contests. To comprehend 
statistical methods, to use them correctly, and to expose errors by others are 
challenges for most lawyers and judges. The purpose of this seminar is to pre-
pare students for this brave new world by introducing them to the basic ideas of 
probability and statistics as they have appeared in the legal arena. The emphasis 
is not on calculation but on what might be called the legal logic of statistical 
inference. The goal is to equip students to recognize issues raised by quantita-
tive methods and to work more knowledgeably with experts. The seminar ends 
with a mock trial of a statistical question in which students examine and cross-
examine expert statisticians. 
CoLUMBIA UNIVERSITY ScHOOL OF LAw BuLLETIN 14 (1994-95). With respect to enrollment, a 
total of 18 students chose this class as a first choice in the fall of 1994, and 14 students (10 
third-year and 4 second-year) finished the class from beginning to end. In the fall of 1993, 5 
students chose this class as a first choice, and 9 students (2 third year, 4 second year, 1 
LL.M. student, and 2 transfer students) finished the class. Last, in the fall of 1992, a total of 
12 students chose "Statistics for Lawyers" as a first choice, and 5 students (3 second year 
and 2 transfer) finished. 
Although the class does not appear to be as popular with the students as some of the 
other electives, there has been an increase in enrollment from 1992 to 1994 (enrollment 
figures were not available prior to 1992); and, based on anecdotal evidence, students gener-
ally enjoy the class. 
81. For example, Professor Curtis Berger of Columbia University School of Law, takes 
his property students to hearings relating to landlord-tenant law in an attempt to demon-
strate that what they are studying in class affects the lives of everyday people. 
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(4) Law schools should encourage, or at least not discourage, collab-
orative empirical scholarship. As mentioned above, collaborative research 
efforts are generally not encouraged in the legal academy, especially for 
tenure purposes. Yet an empirical endeavor often requires the assistance 
of social scientists, for example, sociologists. In light of the value and con-
tribution of empirical research, greater encouragement of collaborative re-
search should be forthcoming from law faculties. Possibly, this 
encouragement could be pecuniary in nature. Alternatively, it could be 
tenure related. Tenured faculty should encourage collaborative research 
by expressing to non-tenured professors that empirical collaborative 
s.cholarship will be viewed equally with traditional forms of scholarship in 
tenure determinations. 
Some may oppugn such a policy and claim that it would give rise to a 
Pandora's Box, inducing non-empirical collaborative research efforts by 
scholars who would come to expect that their scholarship is satisfactory 
for tenure purposes. In response to this claim, I demur. Collaborative le-
gal scholarship, irrespective of subject matter, should be treated equally 
with single-authored legal scholarship. Physicians, scientists, economists, 
sociologists, psychologists, and other academics frequently publish collab-
orative research efforts. Why are legal academics different? Collaborative 
research provides law professors with the opportunity to entertain disci-
plines other than the law, to step outside the confines of the law and 
partake of the rich personal and professional offerings of the university 
community. 82 
(5) Law schools should hire professors who express an interest in 
doing empirical research. This may be a catch-22. Faculty candidates 
may not express an interest in empirical research if they believe that the 
law school is not receptive to empirical research. Even if the law. school 
tells the candidate that empirical research is valued and encouraged, the 
candidate may be justifiably skeptical.83 Thus, one way for the school to 
prove its sincerity is to show the candidate, empirically, that it values 
empirical research. That is, a faculty appointments committee may say to 
the candidate: "Those faculty members who decided to embark on empir-
ical research were granted tenure based on that research;" or "over the 
past five years many members of our faculty have worked closely with 
professors from the sociology and anthropology departments at the uni-
82. See TERESA SuLLIVAN ET AL., As WE FoRGIVE OuR DEBTORS vii (1989), wherein the 
authors state in their preface: 
A fair number of law professors have done empirical studies, but all too often 
with little or no help from social scientists trained in survey research and statis-
tical inference. On the other hand, despite devoting enormous resources to the 
study of income levels and sources, social scientists have largely ignored 
problems of debt .... Our team of two law professors and a demographer arose 
from the happy circumstance of personal and professional relationships that 
threw us together. We learned about common interests, but more importantly we 
came to be fascinated by the things that the other person knew and could do. 
83. Schuck, supra note 4, at 333. Recall, 35% of the tenured professors that I surveyed 
stated that tenure is a factor relating to the lack of empirical scholarship. 
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versity, and have published over thirty collaborative law review articles." 
(6) Law schools or legal foundations should sponsor summer insti-
tutes on empirical research training. Many law professors have learned 
economics by attending multiple week summer institutes. Perhaps, such 
an arrangement can work for training law professors in the empirical 
method; at least it will expose law professors to the rigors associated with 
empirical research. A summer institute would provide an immersion for 
law professors, which facilitates learning. Summer institutes also would 
provide an environment for the development of collegial relationships for 
collaboration and a germination of ideas and areas for empirical studies. 
Of course, I do not expect to witness the implementation of these 
suggestions overnight. However, I do hope to contribute to the dialogue 
that is currently taking place within the legal community about the na-
ture of legal scholarship and its effect on the relationship between the 
academy and the profession. 
CoNCLUSION 
The gap between the legal academy and the legal profession is cause 
for concern. I believe that part of the reason for this rift is the lack of 
empirical legal scholarship being produced by law professors. Empirical 
scholarship speaks to the profession in that it allows judges, legislators, 
administrators, and practitioners to ascertain how the law affects our 
lives and what reforms, if any, need to be implemented. In this regard, 
empirical scholarship is also an instrument of individual and social 
growth. The Pragmatists realized as much, as did notable legal academics 
during the 1920s and 1930s, and the Law and Society movement does 
today. Yet, the legal profession is bereft of empirical scholarship, and the 
primary reason for this is that law professors are not well trained in the 
empirical method. As a remedial measure, law schools should become 
more receptive to courses in the empirical method and statistics; and law 
faculties should encourage the production of more empirical scholarship, 
whether it entails collaboration or not. In essence, legal academics need to 
reestablish a dialogue with the legal profession, and one way of accom-
plishing this is to be more receptive to empirical scholarship. 
